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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case 
Appellant Teufel Nursery, Inc. ("Teufel") maintains the Statement of the Case previously 
submitted in Appellant's Brief filed April 12, 2013. 1 However, since the filing of the 
Appellant's Brief, the District Court has entered an amended judgment and several other 
judgments that are directly related to this appeal, so this Reply Brief will address the additional 
proceedings that have taken place since the filing of Appellant's Brief. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Teufel restates its Course of Proceedings previously filed, and includes and incorporates 
the following additional infonnation. 
On April 12, 2013, Teufel filed its Appellant's Brief. Credit Suisse filed its Respondent's 
Brief on June 6, 2013. In the meantime, Credit Suisse also sought to amend the Second 
Amended Second Revised Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale? Credit 
Suisse filed their Motion for Relief from Judgment and to Amend Second Amended Revised 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale on March 28,2013, (R., Vol. II, pp. 190-
191) along with a memorandum in support. (R., Vol. II, pp. 192-197) A hearing was scheduled 
on the matter on May 23,2013, on the Motion for Relief, among other motions. 
On May 24, 2013, at the District Court's request, Teufel filed its Response to Motion to 
Amend Second Amended Second Revised Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of 
Sale. (R., Vol. II, pp. 198-201) Teufel did not oppose the amendment, but merely stated 
1 As mentioned in the Appellant's Brief, this appeal deals with the failed resort known as Tamarack Resort 
("Tamarack Resort") and its developer, Tamarack Resort, LLC ("Tamarack"). 
2 The Second Amended Second Revised Judgment of Foreclosure and Order of Sale, filed June 18,2012, was the 
main underlying basis for this appeal. (R., pp. 4236-4387). 
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Teufel's position that the District Court had the authority to amend the judgment pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) rather than this Court's remittitur granting the District Court 
jurisdiction to enter additional judgments relating to the Tamarack litigation. (R., Vol. II, pp. 
198-201) On May 28, 2013, Credit Suisse filed its Reply to Teufel's Response to Motion to 
Amend, essentially agreeing with Teufel's position. (R., Vol. II, pp. 202-208) On June 4, 2013, 
the District Court entered its Decision and Order Re: Teufel's Response to Credit Suisse's 
Motion for Relief from the Judgment and To Amend the Second Amended Second Revised 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order for Sale. (R., Vol. II, pp. 209-212) The District 
Court agreed with Teufel that it had authority to enter the amended judgment pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and granted Credit Suisse's motion. (R., Vol. II, pp. 209-212) 
Also on June 4, 2013, almost an entire year after the original Second Amended Revised 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale was filed; the District Court entered its 
Third Amended Second Revised Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale. (R., 
Vol. II, pp. 213-386)3 This judgment specifically dealt with the portion of Tamarack Resort that 
was initially covered in this appeal. (R., Vol. II, pp. 213-386)4 
That same day, the District Court entered four other judgments relating to Tamarack 
Resort property encompassed by the Teufel claim of lien. It entered its Seventh Revised 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure Against Tamarack Resort, LLC, and Order of Sale (R., Vol. 
3 As previously mentioned, there was no original "Judgment" or "First Amended Judgment" that were ever signed 
by the District Court, so the first judgment entered in the case was actually the Second Amended Second Revised 
Judgment. The Third Amended Second Revised Judgment was the only amendment to the original judgment that 
was appealed in this case. 
4 Exhibits A-l, A-2, B-1 and B-3 of both the Second and Third Amended Judgments listed metes and bounds 
descriptions and other lot and block legal descriptions that were property subject to Teufel's Claim of Lien. 
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II, pp. 387-397)5; the Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure Against Tamarack 
Resort, LLC, and Order of Sale of Lake Wing Property (R., Vol. II, pp. 38-405)6; the Amended 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale of Village Plaza Property (R., Vol. II, pp. 
406-415)7; and the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale of the Trillium 
Townhome Property. (R., Vol. II, pp. 416-426)8 As with the original judgment that is the subject 
of this appeal, these judgments were all entered pursuant to the District Court's findings in the 
Substitute Omnibus Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, erroneously setting Teufel's lien 
priority date in 2007 rather than 2004, and thus placing Teufel's priority junior to all other lien 
claimants, including Credit Suisse. 
Teufel timely filed its Amended Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2013. (R., Vol. II, pp. 
427-436) The Amended Notice of Appeal incorporated all of the judgments entered by the 
District Court on June 4, 2013. These judgments concluded all of the pending priority issues 
between Teufel and Credit Suisse that are the basis of this appeal. Consequently, this appeal 
should fully resolve all of Teufel's lien priority issues with Credit Suisse, however; if successful 
on appeal, Teufel's lien priority issues would need to be revisited on remand with the other 
mechanic's lien claimants in the judgments referenced above. 9 
As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, this appeal presents an interesting dynamic between 
questions of fact and law. It is Teufel's position that the District Court made erroneous factual 
5 This Judgment gave BAG Properties, LLC lien priority over Credit Suisse and Teufel for a portion of property 
encompassed by the Teufel claim oflien. 
6 This Judgment gave MHTN, Inc. lien priority over Credit Suisse and Teufel for a portion of property encompassed 
by the T eutel claim oflien. 
7 This Judgment gave BannerlSabbey II, LLC lien priority over Credit Suisse and Teufel for a portion of property 
encompassed by the Teufel claim of lien. 
8 This Judgment gave Tamarack Designs, LLC (formerly EZA, P.c. dba OZ Architecture of Boulder's) lien priority 
over Credit Suisse and Teufel for a portion of property encompassed by the Teufel claim of lien. 
9 BAG Properties, LLC, MHTN, Inc., Banner/Sabbey II, LLC, and Tamarack Designs, LLC. 
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findings which resulted in it making incorrect conclusions of law when it determined that Credit 
Suisse's mortgages had pIioIity over Teufel's claim of lien. This appeal explores those incorrect 
factual findings and conclusions of law, which would expectantly result in the reversal of the 
District Court's detennination regarding priority between Credit Suisse and Teufel, and a remand 
to the DistIict Court to enter judgment accordingly. Fmihermore, now that all judgments have 
been entered in this consolidated case, the DistIict Court would also have to determine prioIity 
between Teufel and the remaining lien claimants that were granted prioIity over Credit Suisse. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
Teufel reiterates its Concise Statement of Facts in its Appellant's Brief. Because Credit 
Suisse did not include a Statement of Facts in its Respondent's Brief, no response is necessary. 
The facts relating to specific legal arguments will be addressed later herein. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel's Claim of Lien Did Not Have 
Priority Over Credit Suisse's Mortgages? 
a. Were the District Court's Factual Findings Regarding Teufel's Claim of Lien 
Clearly Erroneous? 
1. Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel's work at Tamarack 
Resort Was Under Four Separate Contracts and Not a Continuous 
Single Contract? 
11. Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel Only Maintained a 
Skeletal Crew and Not Perform Landscaping or Improvements at 
Tamarack Resort During the Winter Months or That Snow Removal 
Work Was Not Part of the Scope of Work for Teufel's Landscaping 
Contract? 
h. Based Upon the Factual Findings, Should the District Court's Conclusions of 
Law be Reversed? 
1. Did the District Court Incorrectly Determine That Teufel and 
Tamarack Were Not Operating Under an Open Account? 
11. Did the District Court Err Ruling That Teufel's Priority Date Was in 
2007 and That Credit Suisse's Mortgages Were Prior to Teufel's 
Claim of Lien? 
2. Did the District Court Err in Calculating the Lien Amount? 
a. Did the District Court Improperly Eliminate a Portion of Teufel's lien 
Amount? 
b. Did the District Court Err in its Calculation ofInterest? 
3. Did the District Court Err in Apportioning Teufel's Costs and Attorney Fees? 
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II. ARGUMENT 
Credit Suisse incorrectly urges this Court to adopt a new rule of law in Idaho for 
mechanic's liens. Specifically, Credit Suisse argues that priority dates for mechanic's liens 
relate to the "last time a lien claimant was paid" rather than the long-standing Idaho precedent 
requiring priority based upon "first began work on the property."lO Unfortunately, the District 
Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law indicate that this was the direction the District 
Court took in detelmining priority between Credit Suisse and Teufel as well. 
Idaho Code § 45-506 grants a mechanic's lien holder a priority date that relates back to 
the date materials or improvements were first provided by lien holder. Beall Pipe & Tank 
Corp. v. Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 492, 700 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Essentially, the date of priority of a materialman's lien is the commencement date of the work or 
improvement, and has priority over any other lien, including mortgages, tIled or recorded after 
that date. White v. Constitution }.1ining and "~1illing Co., 56 Idaho 403,55 P.2d 152 (1936). 
Priority between mechanic's liens and other liens is governed by Idaho Code § 45-506 
which states, in pertinent part: 
The liens provided for in this chapter shall be on equal footing with those liens 
within the same class ofliens, without reference to the date of the filing of the lien 
claim or claims and are preferred to any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance, 
which may have attached subsequent to the time when the building, improvement 
or structure was commenced . .. 
(Emphasis added). Pursuant to I.C. § 45-506, a mechanic's lien holder's priority date relates 
back to the date materials or improvements were first provided by lien holder. Beall Pipe, 108 
Idaho at 492, 700 P.2d at 114. 
10 See Respondent's Brief, p. 14. 
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Essentially, "commencement date" means the first day work is done on the project, 
whether there is a contract in place for that work or not. In this case, Teufel's "commencement 
date" was June 14, 2004, the first day a shovel hit the ground at Tamarack Resort. 
1. Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel's Claim of Lien Did Not 
Have Priority Over Credit Suisse's Mortgages. 
Credit Suisse properly cites the long-standing precedent in Idaho for determining priority 
for mechanic's liens; however, it then incorrectly applies that law to the facts in this case. 
Specifically, Credit Suisse cited a 1907 case, Valley Lumber & A1fg. Co. v. Driessel, 13 Idaho 
662, 93 P. 765 (1907), for the proposition that "work knowingly provided under a separate and 
distinct contract cannot tack to an earlier contract."!! Credit Suisse, however, completely 
overlooks this Court's most recent decision on this issue, Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. 
Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 740, 264 P .3d 379 (2011), holding that if a project is one 
improvement, the priority date need not "tack," but rather it is when the mechanic's lien claimant 
first contributes to that one improvement. !d. at 746, 264 P.3d at 385. 
a. Were the District Court's Factual Findings Regarding Teufel's Claim of 
Lien Clearly Erroneous? 
Teufel reiterates that the District Court made several erroneous factual findings regarding 
the scope of Teufel's work at Tamarack Resort and the terms of Teufel's contract with 
Tamarack. Credit Suisse disagreed. 
11 See Respondent's Brief, p. 14. 
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i. Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel's 'York at 
Tamarack Resort was Under Four Separate Contracts and Not a 
Continuous Single Contract? 
The evidence at trial established that Teufel had one continuous contract with Tamarack 
and this evidence was uncontroverted by Credit Suisse. Furthermore, in its Respondent's Brief, 
Credit Suisse failed to address the issues raised in Teufel's Appellant's Brief, but rather it 
focused on the incorrect and erroneous findings of the District Court. For example, Credit Suisse 
seemed to hang its hat on the District Court's erroneous findings based upon the Affidavit of 
Rick Christensen, a document that was not admitted into evidence and could not be considered 
by the District Court. There is no dispute that the Affidavit of Rick Christensen was not entered 
or admitted as evidence in the Tamarack trial, yet, the District Court relied upon the Affidavit to 
k . fi d' 12 rna e Its erroneous m mgs. 
According to Idaho Code § 9-101, courts can take judicial notice of the following facts: 
1. The true signification of all English words and phrases, and oflegal 
expressIons. 
2. Whatever is established by law. 
3. Public and private official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial 
departments of this state and of the United States. 
4. The seals of all the courts of this statc and of the United States. 
5. The accession to office and the official signatures and seals of office ofthe 
principal officers of government in the legislative, executive and judicial 
departments of this state and of the United States. 
6. The existence, title, national flag, and seal of every state or sovereign 
recognized by the executive power of the United States. 
7. The seals of courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of notaries 
public. 
8. The laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions and 
political history of the world. In all these cases the court may resort for its aid to 
appropriate books or documents of reference. 
12 See Substitute Omnibus Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Validity, Priority and Amount of Various 
Liens and Mortgage Claims, p. 21 CR., p. 3841). 
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I.e. § 9-101. Courts cannot, however, take judicial notice of pleadings filed in a case that were 
not ultimately admitted at trial. The testimony of witnesses "shall be taken orally in open court 
unless otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, or other 
rules adopted by the Supreme Court ofIdaho." I.R.C.P.43(a). There is simply no statute or rule 
that allows a court to rely upon documentary evidence not admitted at the trial when making its 
factual findings. 
While Idaho does not have a specific case on point, it is well settled only evidence that 
was actually admitted or considered by judicial notice can be considered at trial. For example, 
when answers to interrogatories are not offered and admitted at trial, they are not to be 
considered as evidence in the case. Crollard v. Crollard, 104 Idaho 189, 190-91, 657 P .2d 486, 
487-88 (Ct. App. 1983). The Court of Appeals set forth its analysis as to why such unadmitted 
evidence could not be considered as follows: 
Answers to interrogatories are not part of the pleadings and they are not 
considered evidence unless introduced as such at trial. It has been held that error 
sufficient to reverse a judgment occurs when a judge has used interrogatories that 
have not been introduced into evidence, to establish a fact by inference. . .. 
Moreover, in our view, answers to interr6gatories do not become incorporated 
into evidence in a trial merely by allusion, indirect reference or physical presence 
before the court during the questioning of a witness. None of these circumstances 
suffices as a substitute for the application of the rules of evidence to establish the 
admissibility of the answer - especially where a party is precluded, by a judge's 
post-trial decision to treat the answers as evidence, from the opportunity to voice 
an objection to such evidence and to obtain a ruling thereon. . .. Consequently, 
we hold there was no competent evidence introduced at trial. .. 
Id. at 191, 657 P .2d at 488 (citations omitted). 
Credit Suisse failed to offer any response to the portion of Teufel's Appellant's Brief 
setting forth all of the clearly erroneous factual findings of the District Court. Rather, Credit 
Suisse simply reiterated the District Court's erroneous findings based on the Affidavit of Rick 
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Christensen, followed by selective citations to the trial transcript that ignored Christensen's clear 
testimony on point that Teufel was the single landscaper, working on a single project for 
Tamarack Resort, and that the yearly agreements were merely reiterations of the overall contract 
with specific unit prices for materials that varied from year to year. The facts Credit Suisse (and 
the District Court) overlooked included: 
• Teufel was hired by Tamarack in 2004 as the exclusive landscape company for 
Tamarack Resort and installed all of the landscaping at Tamarack Resort. (Tr., Vol. 
II, pp. 239-40, 11. 24-25,1-14; p. 543,11.17-22) 
• Tamarack represented that the project would be a multi-year project and it was 
Tamarack's intent to have one single landscape provider. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 254,11.3-18) 
• Tamarack did not have a landscaping plan or other landscape specifications. This 
made drafting a multiyear contract impossible because there was no plan to provide 
the basis for the contract. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 236,11. 7-22) 
• Landscape Construction Agreements were drafted based on an established unit price 
and time and material basis for that year's pricing. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 256, 11. 22-24) 
• The yearly agreements were a continuation of the work of each prior agreement. (Tr., 
Vol. II, p. 260, 11. 13-18) 
• The 2004 Landscape Construction Agreement was extended in 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 540, 11. 4-14) 
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• Christensen testified that the landscape agreements (Tr. Exs. 9:001, 9:002, 9:003, 
9:004) were not "separate or individual contracts with Tamarack Resort" but rather "it 
was just a modification ofthe original document." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 296, 11. 20_25)13 
• Christensen and Chris Kirk both testified that Teufel worked continuously from June 
2004 through August of 2008, never actually discontinuing making improvements to 
Tamarack Resort in that time. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 545, 11. 15-18; Tr. Vol. II, p. 294, 11. 6-
18,p. 296, 11. 17-19) 
It was undisputed that there was no intent by Tamarack or Teufel that more than one 
contract governed Teufel's work at Tamarack Resort. Credit Suisse failed to introduce any 
evidence to controvert the testimony of either Christensen or Tamarack's project manager, Chris 
Kirk. To the contrary, Credit Suisse cited the testimony of Kirk in its Respondent's Brief 
summarizing Teufel's agreements14, but Credit Suisse failed to cite the testimony whereby Kirk 
affinned that Teufel was hired as the general landscaper for all of Tamarack Resort, (Tr., Vol. II, 
p. 538, 11. 3-7), that Teufel was never fired as the general landscaper for Tamarack Resort, (Tr., 
Vol. 11., p. 540, 11. 4-14), the 2005 agreement was an extension of the 2004 agreement, (Tr., Vol. 
II, p. 540, 11. 4-8), and that the scope and amount of work Teufel did for Tamarack Resort did 
not shift and change from year to year. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 543,11. 23-25) 
13 Notably, despite the fact that the District Court relied on the Affidavit of Rick Christensen to "contradict" this 
clear testimony given at trial, the Affidavit of Rick Christensen does not actually contradict the testimony at trial. 
The Affidavit was offered in summary judgment proceedings and the paragraphs relied upon by the Court (and 
adopted by Credit Suisse in their Respondent's Brief) were foundational only and meant to provide background to 
introduce the documents for summary judgment purposes. The District Court actually relied on the Affidavit of 
Rick Christensen to deny Credit Suisse's motion for summary judgment. (R., p. 2809). 
14 Credit Suisse cited Kirk's testimony on cross-examination that Teufel needed to lock in their fees from year to 
year and this is why individual agreements were drafted from year to year. (See Respondent's Briefp. 17, and Tr., 
Vol. 11., p. 546,11. 8-13). 
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Credit Suisse then dedicated the next six pages of its Respondent's Brief on the "plain 
language" of the agreements, incorrectly concluding that they were separate contracts. Credit 
Suisse, however, failed to identify any evidence in the record or trial transcript to rebut the 
following: 
• The 2004 Landscape Constmction Agreement included language that stated, "[ s ]uch 
other tasks as may be directed by the Owner's Representatives," a catchall phrase that 
allowed Teufel to perform duties outside of the strict letter of the agreement. (Tr. Ex. 
9:001) 
• The 2005 Landscape Constmction Agreement (Tr. Ex. 9:002), states that unit prices 
for tasks will be provided in Exhibit "B." Exhibit B provides a spreadsheet of the 
plants and materials for the anticipated work in 2005. Page 3 of Exhibit B has one 
column that is not identified in the Scope of Work, titled "Overall Site." This catchall 
category allocated plants to Tamarack Resort as a whole. 
• Teufel worked through 2005 on every part of the Tamarack Resort. (Tr. Ex. 9:042; 
Tr., Vol. II, pp. 266-272) As testified by Christensen and Kirk, Teufel completed 
work on every aspect and in every location within the Tamarack Resort in 2004 and 
2005. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 277, 11. 2-18, pp. 543-44, ll. 23-25, 1-3) 
• The 2006 Landscape Constmction Agreement (Tr. Ex. 9:003) states that unit prices 
for tasks will be provided in Exhibit "B" that included a column for "Spring-Fall 
overa11l row screening, etc." 
• Teufel's work went well outside the bounds of the Scope of Work in the 2006 
Landscape Constmction Agreement. (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 543-44,11.23-25, 1-3) 
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It The 2007 Landscape Construction Agreement (Tr. Ex. 9:004) included a "Spring -
other plantings" provision in the Scope of Work, which also demonstrates the intent 
to work outside of the enumerated areas in the Scope of Work. 
Moreover, the plain language of the 2005, 2006, and 2007 Landscape Construction 
Agreements demonstrates that the contracts were extensions of previous contracts. Credit 
Suisse failed to rebut or explain the following tenns in each ofthe continuation agreements: 
I) In the 2005 Landscape Construction Agreement (Tr. Ex. 9:002), the Scope of Work 
includes work such as, "1. Finish landscape installation for 20 Twin Creek Chalets 
and Rock Creek Cottages ... 3. Complete landscaping for Entry & Whitewater 
Roundabouts ... " (emphasis added). This is a clear indicator that the work was 
ongoing, unifonn and one part of the same improvement. 
It The 2006 Landscape Construction Agreement has similar language: "Complete the 
landscape for the Bayview Sales Mod ... Supplement landscaping at Discovery 
Village," (Tr. Ex. 9:003) 
• The 2007 Landscape Construction Agreement required the "Completion of Golden 
Bar Townhomes (balance) ... " (emphasis added). (Tr. Ex. 9:004) 
Furthennore, most of the projects themselves were multi-year endeavors. For example, 
Teufel's work at Golden Bar was first placed in the Scope of Work in 2005 and included in 2006 
and 2007. Other areas which spanned multiple years include Discovery Village, Discovery 
Chalets, Golf and Snow Maintenance Buildings, Golf Course, Staircase Chalets, Arling Center, 
and Steelhead Chalets. (Tr. Exs. 9:001, 9:002, 9:003, 9:004) The plain language of the 
agreements combined with the undisputed testimony of Kirk and Christensen that this was one 
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project, one improvement with no variance to the scope and nature of work confirms that the 
District Court made the clearly elToneous factual finding that Teufel had four separate and 
distinct contracts with Tamarack. 
The exhibits and testimony presented at trial clearly establish that Teufel worked at 
Tamarack Resort under one contract, which was extended through 2007. Credit Suisse failed to 
point to any substantial or competent evidence in the record that would support the District 
Court's elToneous findings. Thus, Teufel's priority date was June of 2004 when it initially 
commenced work at Tamarack Resort, making it prior to the date Credit Suisse recorded its 
mortgages. 
ii. Did the District Court Err in Finding That Teufel Only 
Maintained a Skeletal Crew and Not Perform Landscaping or 
Improvements at Tamarack Resort During the Winter Months or 
That Snow Removal Work Was Not Part of the Scope of Work for 
Teufel's Landscaping Contract? 
Credit Suisse failed to point this Court to any evidence in the record that would refute the 
clear testimony at trial that Teufel never left Tamarack during the winter months. Rather, Credit 
Suisse simply cited to the District Court's clearly elToneous factual finding that Teufel "only 
maintained a skeletal crew at the Resort during the winter months.,,15 Credit Suisse failed to 
address the following substantial, competent, and uncontroverted evidence: 
.. The only time period Teufel did not have a crew present at Tamarack Resort was 
December 22, 2004, to April 19, 2005. 
• The evidence presented at trial clearly established that Teufel had a full crew on site 
from April 19, 2005, through December 31,2007, and into 2008. 
15 See Respondent's Brief, p. 25. 
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• Christensen explained, "[S]ome of what we did, an important part of what we did is 
allowed for other construction to proceed. So if we weren't there, it literally could 
have brought the project to a halt. So that's why it was important for us to continue 
on." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 334, 11. 7-12) 
In addition, Credit Suisse reiterated the District Court's erroneous finding that the winter 
work was non-landscaping, citing the testimony of Mike Stanger, one of Teufel's witnesses. 
Mike Stanger testified that "one crew in 2007, the winter of 2007, ... was directly assigned to 
clearing snow for construction of the Trillium Cottages and Trillium Townhomes." (Tr., Vol. II, 
pp. 518-19,11.24-15,1-2) However, Mike Stanger's next sentence stated, "[a]nd we had another 
crew working in the Staircase Chalets ... and that work was again pathways and walkways." (Tr., 
Vol. II, p. 519, 11. 2-3) This testimony was further supported by Trial Exhibit 9:047, the daily 
force accounts for January 2007. The work at the Staircase Chalets entailed far more than snow 
removal. Soil was graded on January 2, 2007, steps and pavers were installed on January 3, 
2007, and grading continued on January 4,2007. (Tr. Ex. 9:047) Teufel does not dispute that it 
performed snow removal at Tamarack Resort during January 2007; however, it did far more than 
snow removal as the evidence, both documentary and oral,16 amply demonstrated. 17 There is 
simply no evidence to support the District Court's tInding, rendering the finding clearly 
erroneous. 
It was undisputed at trial that Teufel performed substantial work at the request of 
Tamarack outside the Scope of \Vork listed in each Landscaping Construction Agreement, 
16 Tr., Vol. II, pp. 518-19,11. 24-25,1-3; p. 255, 11. 8-17; p. 295, 11. 4-9. 
17 See Appendix A to Appellant's Brief, setting forth all work done by Teufel during the winter months at Tamarack 
Resort, which clearly demonstrates that the work was not insignificant or the crews "skeletal." 
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during the winter months. This work was billed at a time and hourly basis to Tamarack. (e.g. 
Tr., Vol. II, pp. 344-45, 11. 7-25, 1-8) (Tr. Exs. 9:041, 9:043, 9:045, 9:047) Because Teufel 
performed substantial work outside the Scope of Work from 2004 to 2007 under a time and 
material basis, there is an unbroken chain of work done outside of the Scope of Work for which 
it was specific contractual obligation, except for the "anticipation of future transaction." See 
Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 849, 851, 87 P.3d 955, 960 (2004). The work 
provided on an open account outside of the contractual obligations is lienable and supports the 
lienability of the contractual work. Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 849, 851, 
87 P.3d 955,960 (2004). 
The four exhibits that encompassed all of the work orders and daily force accounts for the 
work done at Tamarack Resort by Teufel, Trial Exhibits 9:041, 9:043, 9:045 and 9:047, provide 
ample evidence that Teufel was performing work both within and outside of the Landscaping 
Construction Agreements, and that Teufel maintained a steady and continuous presence at 
Tamarack Resort year round. There is no evidence to support the District Court's contrary 
findings, thus the District Court's findings are clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
b. Based Upon the Factual Findings, Should the District Court's 
Conclusions of Law be Reversed? 
The District Court erred when it found that Teufel's work at Tamarack Resort was under 
four separate contracts, rather than one single contract and one single improvement. Based upon 
these erroneous findings, the District Court then made the incorrect legal conclusion that Credit 
Suisse's mortgages were prior to Teufel's Claim of Lien. Credit Suisse failed to cite any Idaho 
case law that would support its position that Teufel's claim of lien did not have priority over its 
mortgages. 
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i. Did the District Court Incorrectly Determine That Teufel and 
Tamarack Were Not Operating Under an Open Account? 
Credit Suisse properly cited the Idaho authority on open accounts, namely Franklin 
Building Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 851, 87 P.3d 955, 960 (2004). However, it then 
went on to incorrectly state that in Idaho, only materialmen, not laborers, are entitled to maintain 
open accounts. 18 There is simply no basis in law for such an assertion. To the contrary, an open 
account is: 
Id. 
Simply an account with a balance which has not been ascertained. The account is 
kept open in anticipation of future transaction. Where an open account exists that 
parties are deemed to intend that individual items on the account will not be 
viewed separately but the account will be considered as a connected series of 
transactions. 
Credit Suisse provided no response to Teufel's assertion that it maintained an open 
account for its work at Tamarack Resort for all work done outside of the scope and letter of the 
agreements. It was completely uncontroverted that all of the work Teufel performed outside of 
the contract from June 2004 to 2008 was performed as Tamarack dictated. There was no set 
amount of work, or a total amount to be paid or even a comprehensive plan any given year. (Tr., 
Vol. II, pp. at 8:9-22; 38:2-8; 66:15-25; Tr. Ex. 9:040A) 
As Teufel operated at Tamarack Resort under an open contract, all of its work constituted 
a single improvement and its priority relates back to the first date that Teufel provided labor or 
materials to Tamarack Resort, June 14, 2004. I.e. §45-506; see Ultrawall, Inc. v. Washington 
kIu!. Bank, 135 Idaho 832, 25 P.3d 855 (2001). Again, this legal premise was completely 
overlooked by Credit Suisse in its Respondent's Brief 
18 See Respondent's Brief, p. 27. 
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ii. Did the District Court Err Concluding That Teufel's Priority Date 
'Vas in 2007 and That Credit Suisse's Mortgages \Vere Prior to 
Teufel's Claim of Lien? 
Credit Suisse cited no legal authority to support its position that Teufel's priority date 
was in 2007 because that Teufel had already been paid for its work in 2004,2005 and 2006. The 
District Court detennined that in order for Teufel's work to relate back to 2004, "the work must 
have been such to constitute a continuous single agreement." (R., p. 3838) (citing Terra- West, 
Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 247 P.3d 620 (2010)). While the District Court 
properly cited Terra-West for this proposition, the District Court misapplied the law to the facts 
of this case. This Court exercises free review over the District Court's legal conclusions. 
As pointed out in Appellant's Brief, this Court recently issued a decision with facts very 
similar to the Tamarack matter in Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 
151 Idaho 740, 264 P.3d 379 (2011). Like this case, Hopkins addressed the scope of an 
improvement for a landscaping company like the improvements Teufel contributed to the 
Tamarack Resort. In Hopkins this Court expressly held that, "the labor and materials provided 
were for the benefit of the entire golf course and driving range, rather than for the individual 
improvements making up the golf course. Therefore, the golf course project is more properly 
characterized as a single improvement." Id. at 746, 264 P.3d at 385. The ruling in Hopkins is 
equally applicable here. Teufel's work at Tamarack Resort constituted a single improvement, as 
Teufel has asserted since the commencement of its foreclosure action. The Landscape 
Construction Agreements clearly state that the Project is the General Landscaping Work at 
Tamarack Resort, just as the contractor in Hopkins was to construct an 18 hole golf course and 
practice range. Teufel's work was divided into components covering all of Tamarack Resort, 
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like the work was divided into thirteen components in Hopkins. Thus, just as this Court ruled 
that the contractor's work in Hopkins constituted a single improvement, Teufel's work at 
Tamarack Resort constituted a single improvement. 
Credit Suisse failed to point to any substantial or competent evidence that disputed the 
fact that Teufel performed work over every portion of Tamarack Resort each year. (Tr. Exs. 
9:040, 9:040A, 9:042, 9:044, 9:046; Tr., Vol. II, pp. 543-44, 11. 23-25, 1-5) Teufel's work at 
Tamarack Resort constituted a continuous improvement that benefited the entire resort. Under 
Hopkins, Teufel's work did not cease and start over every year, and Teufel improved 
substantially all of Tamarack Resort continuously, rendering its work a single improvement. (Tr. 
Ex.9:040A) 
Moreover, Teufel's work outside of the substantial completion dates further supports a 
conclusion that there was a continuous agreement. Each Landscape Construction Agreement 
states that Teufel must commence work at Tamarack Resort as of the date of the Landscape 
Construction Agreement and "shall achieve substantial completion of the entire Work not later 
than ... " (Tr. Exs. 9:001, 9:002, 9:003, 9:004) Testimony during trial reflected that Teufel did 
not meet these deadlines. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 253, 11. 1-5) Instead of suing Teufel for a breach of 
contract for failing to meet the substantial completion dates, Tamarack directed Teufel to move 
fOf'Nard with the work after the substantial completion dates under the same terms Teufel had 
been working. (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 272-73, 11. 23-25, 1-4) 
Finally, and even more informative, is the language used in the 2005, 2006 and 2007 
Landscaping Agreements to describe the identified work; "Finish landscape installation ... ," 
"Complete landscaping ... ," (Tr. Ex. 9:002), "Supplemental landscaping ... ," "Completion of 
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the landscape .... " (Tr. Ex. 9:003), and "Completion of Golden Bar Townhomes." (Tr. Ex. 
9:004) (emphasis added). This plain language points to the parties' intent that Teufel 
continuously work on Tamarack Resort as a single, contiguous improvement. 
Because the District Court erroneously found that Teufel had four separate contracts with 
Tamarack, it incorrectly concluded that Teufel's priority date was in 200i 9, and ultimately 
concluded that Credit Suisse's mortgages were prior to Teufel's Claim of Lien. This Court 
exercises free review over conclusions of law, and given the errors of the District Court in this 
case, this Court should reverse the District Court and find that Teufel's Claim of Lien is superior 
to the Credit Suisse mortgages. 
2. Did the District Court Err in Calculating the Lien Amount? 
The District Court improperly reduced Teufel's lien amount after the trial and further 
adopted the incorrect interest calculation in formulating Teufel's overall amount due. 
a. Did the District Court improperly eliminate a portion of Teufel's lien 
amount? 
Teufel presented substantial and competent evidence that the amount of its claim of lien 
that had priority over Credit Suisse's mortgages totaled $406,199.07. The District Court 
improperly reduced that amount to $306,543.30. (R., pp. 3842-46)20 The District Court based 
19 Again, contrary to Idaho law, the District Court and Credit Suisse both reason that Teufel had been paid for its 
work in 2004, 2005 and 2006, thus it could only lien for its 2007 work. 
20 Teufel's original claim oflien totaled $564,560.23. (Tr. Ex. 9:006) The claim oflien included an allocation of 
amounts by area of the Tamarack Resort where the improvements were made. Although Teufel was not paid for any 
of the work covered by the claim of lien, Teufel was required to partially release its lien as to certain parcels of 
property within the Tamarack Resort because its prior attorney failed to name the property owners in the original 
complaint. These partial releases only released Teufel's lien priority for those amounts, but did not extinguish the 
actual amount Tamarack owed Teufel for the improvements. Teufel obtained a monetary judgment against 
Tamarack for the entire amount owed, plus costs and attorney's fees. The lien amount relating to priority over 
Credit Suisse's mortgages is the only issue in dispute for this appeal. 
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its decision to reduce the amount of the claim of lien for parcels that were not allocated to any 
one parcel, inappropriately negating almost $100,000 of Teufel's claim oflien. 
Generally, if a claim of lien covers multiple properties or improvements, the lien claimant 
is required to allocate its lien among the various properties or improvements. I.C. § 45-508. The 
statute states: 
In every case in which one (1) claim is filed against two (2) or more buildings, 
mines, mining claims, or other improvements, owned by the same person, the 
person filing such claim must, at the same time, designate the amount due him on 
each of said buildings, mines, mining claims, or other improvement; otherwise the 
lien of such claim is postponed to other liens. The lien of such claim does not 
extend beyond the amount designated as against other creditors having liens by 
judgment, mortgage, or otherwise, upon either of such buildings, or other 
improvements, or upon the land upon which the same are situated. 
I.C. § 45-508. However, if the work constitutes one improvement, such as landscaping for an 
entire project, the claim of lien does not fall under the requirements of I.e. § 45-508. Hopkins, 
151 Idaho at 746, 264 P.3d at 385. This Court has further reiterated: 
The purpose of Idaho's mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes, Chapter 5, 
Title 45, Idaho Code, ("lien law") is to compensate persons who perform labor 
and provide materials for improvements to or upon real property. See generally 
BMC West Corp. v. Horkiey, 144 Idaho 890, 893-94, 174 P.3d 399, 402-03 
(2007). In Idaho, "[mJaterialman's lien laws are construed liberally in favor of the 
person who performs labor upon or furnishes materials to be used in the 
construction of a building." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Indeed, such a right 
is grounded in Idaho's Constitution, which provides that "[t]he legislature shall 
provide by proper legislation for giving to mechanics, laborers, and material men 
an adequate lien on the subject matter of their labor." Idaho Const. art. XIII, § 6. 
Id. at 744,264 P.3d at 383. Although "improvement" is not defined in the lien law, this Court in 
Hopkins was abundantly clear that grading, filling, leveling, or otherwise improving ground was 
distinguished from improvements to buildings and structures. Id. If the improvements are made 
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to the land as a whole, it is more properly characterized as a single improvement and not bound 
by the allocation requirements in I.C. § 45-508. Id. at 746, 264 P.3d at 385. 
In this case, the District Court invalidated portions of Teufel's Claim of Lien because the 
retention fees and erosion control amounts were not allocated to specific parcels of property. 
(R., p. 3846) Credit Suisse failed to direct this Court to any authority supporting the District 
Court's erroneous decision. Notably, Teufel was not required to allocate its Claim of Lien to 
such a mathematical certainty between the parcels at Tamarack. (See Hopkins discussion, 
supra). The District Court stated that Teufel had met its burden of proof on the information 
contained in Exhibit 9:05621 , but then it still reduced the lien for the erosion control and retention 
amounts, because "the item did not relate to any specific parcel for which foreclosure was 
sought." (R., p. 3846, fns. 68, 70, 72, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 90) The District Court improperly 
determined that these parcels "were not subject to the lien" because they were not attached to 
specific parcels or part of the "property" owned by Tamarack. Id. In all, the District Court 
subtracted $99,655.77 from Teufel's lien amount based on its lack of specificity in the lien, 
contrary to Idaho law.22 Credit Suisse simply glossed over this fact and stated that Hopkins did 
not apply to Teufel because the Tamarack Resort "was not like a single project like a golf 
course. ,,23 
Further, Credit Suisse incorrectly stated in its Respondent's Brief that Teufel could not 
explain why there was discrepancy with the dollar amounts in the final calculation at trial and in 
21 Trial Exhibit 9:056 is attached to Appellant's Brief as Appendix 1. 
22 See I.e. § 45-508, and Hopkins, 151 Idaho 740, 264 P.3d 379. 
23 See Respondent's Brief. p. 30. 
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the previously filed trial brief or lien disclosures?4 To the contrary, Christensen specifically 
testified that the "erosion control" amount was mistakenly left out of the calculation "because it 
couldn't be pigeonholed to a parcel, so it was just left off when, in fact, it deserved to be 
included." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 475, 11. 21-24) He further testified that "retention" amounts were also 
left out of the previous disclosure for the same reason, that they were not attributable to anyone 
specific parcel. (Tr., Vol. II, 11. 3-17) Christensen went on to testify that the amount of the lien 
was $406,199.07, which went completely uncontradicted by Credit Suisse. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 497, 
1. 1) 
Because Teufel's lien need not be allocated in order to maintain validity and priority, this 
Court should reverse the District Court's reduction in the lien amount and reinstate Teufel's 
Claim of Lien in the amount of $406,199.07 as sought, and proven, at trial. 
b. Did the District Court Err in its Calculation of Interest? 
The District Court incorrectly adopted Credit Suisse's interest calculation, which is not 
supported by Idaho law. Credit Suisse argued that Teufel's rate of interest should be variable 
because this is the rate the District Court applied to the other lien claimants in the overall 
Tamarack Litigation?5 
Teufel contracted with Tamarack to install landscaping at Tamarack Resort. Pursuant to 
the Paragraph 6.4 of the Landscape Construction Agreement: 
Payments due and unpaid under this Agreement shall bear interest 
from the date payment is due at a per annum rate equal to the 
prime rate published by Wells Fargo Bank in Boise, Idaho plus two 
percent (2%). 
24 For the same reason it was inappropriate for the District Court to rely upon the Affidavit of Rick Christensen, it 
was equally inappropriate for the District Court to rely on the Trial Brief as substantive evidence at the trial when 
the trial brief was not admitted into evidence. See argument supra, p. pp. 8-11. 
25 See Respondent's Brief, p. 37. 
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Paragraph 6.4 is found in the Landscape Construction Agreements for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 
2007. (Tr. Exs. 9:001, 9:002, 9:003, 9:004) There was no reference to a variable interest rate in 
any of the Landscape Construction Agreements. Under the terms of the Landscape Construction 
Agreements, Paragraph 6.2.1, "payments shall be made by Owner no later than twenty (20) days 
after the Landscape Architect receives the Application for Payment." These calculations were 
provided to the District Court, yet it did not adopt the prejudgment interest calculation according 
to the Landscape Construction Agreements. Rather, the District Court erroneously adopted 
Credit Suisse's interest calculation citing its prior rulings in other mechanic's lien claims that the 
interest rate should be variable. This finding, however, is not supported by Teufel's Landscape 
Construction Agreements, which do not cite to a variable interest rate. (R., p. 4240) Credit 
Suisse failed to provide any legal authority explaining why it would be appropriate for the 
District Court to deviate from the plain language of the Landscape Construction Agreements. 
Accordingly, the District Court's interest calculation should be reversed and Teufel's 
calculations should be applied. 
3. Did the District Court Err in Apportioning Teufel's Costs and Attorney 
Fees? 
The District Court improperly apportioned Teufel's costs and attorneys' fees. Idaho 
Code § 45-513 states, in pertinent part, "the court shall also allow as part of the costs the moneys 
paid for filing and recording the claim, and reasonable attorney's fees." This has been 
interpreted to mean that "a successful lien claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
incurred in foreclosure proceedings." Perception Constr. l\1gmt. v. Bell, 151 Idaho 250, 254 
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P.3d1246 (2011). As Teufel successfully established its lien and its right to foreclose, it is 
entitled to attorney fees under I.C. §45-513. 
Credit Suisse argued that because Teufel's claim of lien was not given priority over 
Credit Suisse's mortgages, a forty percent (40%) reduction in its fees were appropriate. Notably, 
Credit Suisse did not argue that if Teufel is ultimately granted priority by this Court, Teufel's 
costs and attorneys' fees were unreasonable or unnecessary. Credit Suisse simply reiterated the 
"prevailing party" analysis and argued that the District Court was within its discretion to 
apportion fees based on the priority issue. 
Furthermore, the District Court did not make any findings that Teufel's attorneys' fees 
and costs were unreasonable. Thus, if the District Court's decision regarding priority between 
Teufel and Credit Suisse is reversed, Teufel should be awarded all of its costs and fees. 
Consequently, Teufel would be entitled to costs as a matter of right in the amount of $4,239.23, 
discretionary costs in the amount of $8,843.27 and attorneys' fees in the amount of $270,942.00, 
for a total of $284,024.50. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This appeal presents issues of both fact and law. The District Court made erroneous 
factual findings which resulted in it making incorrect conclusions of law when it determined that 
Credit Suisse's mortgages had priority over Teufel's claim of lien. After reviewing the Record, 
the Trial Transcript, and the Trial Exhibits, it should be apparent that the District Court's factual 
findings were clearly erroneous and not based upon substantial or competent evidence. Credit 
Suisse failed to direct this Court to any substantial or competent evidence or legal authority to 
support the District Court's findings and conclusions. Consequently, Teufel respectfully 
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requests that this Court reverse the District Court's erroneous findings of fact, and determine as a 
matter of law that Teufel's Claim of Lien has lien priority over Credit Suisse's mortgages, and 
the amount of Teufel's lien is $406,199.07, plus prejudgment interest as set forth herein, 
including all of Teufel's costs and attorneys' fees sought below. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _-"----'_ day of July, 2013. 
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PICKENS LAW, P.A. 
By: 
Terri R. Pickens, ofthe firm 
Attorneys for Teufel Nursery, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of July, 2013, I caused to be served two ---
true and accurate copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF by placing the same in the United 
States mail, First Class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Bruce Badger 
Fabian Clendenin 
215 S. State, Ste. 1200, Ste. 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2323 
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